June, 2016

  • June 15, 2016
  • Denis-PombriantIn these corporatist times replete with the second coming of the Robber Barons, it was particularly gratifying yesterday to see that a three judge panel sitting on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia sided with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to ensure net neutrality. Why the 2-1 decision was not unanimous is baffling.

    The case pitted the FCC against a posse of trade groups and broadband companies that wanted to charge different rates thus enabling some Internet companies with greater resources to buy faster delivery of their services than other companies that might be relegated to providing their services through slower pipes.

    But we should not be uncorking good French champagne yet because the split decision can easily be appealed all the way to the Supreme Court and some broadband providers have considerable experience arguing successfully there. From my last book, Solve for the Customer, we have this example:

    Below a March 27, 2013, New York Times headline that read, “Court Rejects Antitrust Suit in Victory for Comcast,” reporter Edward Wyatt wrote that the U.S. Supreme Court had thrown out a proposed class-action lawsuit by a group of more than two million Comcast cable subscribers. According to the article, “The plaintiffs accused Comcast of creating a monopoly by buying cable groups in the Philadelphia area that gave it 69 percent of that market in 2007, up from 24 percent in 1998.”1 The subscribers were suing for $875 million in damages. Put simply, the suit alleged that Comcast had created a monopoly so that it could raise prices; the present and former customers wanted some of their money back.

    Comcast’s tactics, which were well documented in Susan P. Crawford’s excellent book, Captive Audience: The Telecom Industry and Monopoly Power in the New Gilded Age,2 are relatively common in the cable industry, where providers engage in what Crawford calls clustering: trading service areas so that each provider ends up with contiguous territory to make it easier to string cables and service their respective customer bases — all without competition.

    The practice also affects traditional telecommunications providers, since cable and phone services have been seeping into each other’s businesses for many years. Through clustering, cable companies could more or less select their customers and reduce the cost of providing service, something that telecommunications providers couldn’t do. Telecoms had to take all comers according to rules put in place by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) — rules that mysteriously don’t apply to cable.

    Clustering tactics aren’t new, though the underlying technologies may be. Railroads tried a version of this approach in the 19th century, and just about any new service that requires a heavy investment in infrastructure is prone to it.3 The way to make a profit in an infrastructure-intensive business is to minimize the necessary infrastructure while using it to serve the greatest number of customers. The more people you can serve, the more profitable you can be. That’s why heavily populated urban areas get new infrastructure first and rural areas always seem to be the last to get things like electricity, telephone, and cable.

    To an untrained eye, the class-action suit seemed to have merit and it was odd to see the Supreme Court take on such a case. But too often in the run up to a court date, attorneys play a game of inside baseball, perfectly legal, in which they attempt to prevent a trial by discrediting their opponent’s case in pretrial motions. Comcast’s legal maneuvering involved questioning whether or not the two million angry subscribers were, in fact, a class that was homogeneous enough to sue under the rules of class actions. A federal appeals court had already decided this point in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that they were indeed a class; the issue ended up before the high court after Comcast appealed. So, from the Supreme Court’s perspective, the case turned on the narrow definition of a class — not on the merits of the class’s claims against Comcast. The majority, in an opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, said no, they weren’t a class, and threw the case out in a 5-to-4 decision.

    A 5-to-4 majority is as thin as it gets, but it’s enough to win an argument in this democracy. The minority, though, was as aggrieved (they don’t get mad on the Supreme Court) as a cat dropped in a toilet by a two-year-old.

    The minority quartet, led by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, wrote in its dissent that the majority had produced a ruling that “…is good for this day and case only,” and sets forth a profoundly mistaken view of antitrust law.”4 You could interpret this as the minority accusing the majority of being the bagman for Comcast.

    Comcast’s behavior doesn’t seem to be very CRM-ish to say the least. Nonetheless, I am confident about net neutrality’s chances at any level of appeal and much of my optimism stems from Susan P. Crawford’s, Captive Audience: The Telecom Industry and Monopoly Power in the New Gilded Age.

    Crawford traces the meaning of a common carrier through most of our history paying special attention to railroads, building the electric grid, telecommunications, and today’s discussion of how the Internet ought to work. Let’s back up a moment and review what a common carrier is. According to Wikipedia,

    A common carrier in common law countries (corresponding to a public carrier in civil law systems,[1] usually called simply a carrier) is a person or company that transports goods or people for any person or company and that is responsible for any possible loss of the goods during transport.[2] A common carrier offers its services to the general public under license or authority provided by a regulatory body. The regulatory body has usually been granted “ministerial authority” by the legislation that created it. The regulatory body may create, interpret, and enforce its regulations upon the common carrier (subject to judicial review) with independence and finality, as long as it acts within the bounds of the enabling legislation.

    There’s a lot more on the subject if you elect to follow the link and I recommend it.

    So, the FCC is one such regulatory body, granted authority by legislation to bring order to all things communication oriented in the United States. Its rulings in favor of net neutrality are what the plaintiffs in the case were appealing but the court correctly ruled that the FCC did, indeed, have the power to regulate. That should end the discussion but it likely will not. In this country you never give up just because some appeals court rules against you. That’s what checkbooks and the Supreme Court are for, so count on an appeal.

    The Plaintiffs will likely want to make the point that they are not simply common carriers providing what amounts to infrastructure services, but that they are content providers more in line with a contract carrier, again according to the same Wikipedia entry:

    A contract carrier (also called a public carrier in UK English),[2] which is a carrier that transports goods for only a certain number of clients and that can refuse to transport goods for anyone else, and from a private carrier.

    This might seem to enable the likes of Comcast and others to charge different rates for its services. But the reality is that Comcast is at bottom, a common carrier that happens to have surrounded itself with content through the acquisition of providers like the NBC television network. But so far at least the courts have recognized these sandwiches of content and carrier for what they are. Further to the point and again relying on Wikipedia, we have this defining characteristic of a common carrier,

    A common carrier holds itself out to provide service to the general public without discrimination (to meet the needs of the regulator’s quasi judicial role of impartiality toward the public’s interest) for the “public convenience and necessity.” A common carrier must further demonstrate to the regulator that it is “fit, willing, and able” to provide those services for which it is granted authority. Common carriers typically transport persons or goods according to defined and published routes, time schedules, and rate tables upon the approval of regulators. Public airlines, railroads, bus lines, taxicab companies, cruise ships, motor carriers (i.e., trucking companies), and other freight companies generally operate as common carriers. Under US law, an ocean freight forwarder cannot act as a common carrier.[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_carrier

    This would seem to nail the case for net neutrality but it’s impossible to assume that on appeal the Supreme Court might not come up with another decision that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg could label as good for this day and this case only. But wait a minute, the court will probably deadlock 4-4 because they’re down one justice courtesy of senate intransigence. Who let that happen?

     

     

    Published: 8 years ago


    indexMicrosoft’s acquisition of LinkedIn for more than $26 billion raised a lot of eyebrows for good reason. True, the acquired company is valuable and generating revenue but like most of the social networking space, it is far from healthy and one wonders if Microsoft could have gotten a better deal.

    According to a colleague at the Enterprise Irregulars, Ross Mayfield, Ellen Levy reported that the deal can boast a number of superlatives if you look at it right, among them,

    • The largest sale of a consumer Internet company in history;
    • The largest sale of an enterprise software/cloud company in history;
    • The third largest sale of a technology company since 2001; and
    • The largest acquisition ever made by Microsoft.

    With those attributes you might expect that LinkedIn is in a really hot sector and everybody wants to get it at any price. It looks like a regular feeding frenzy. Well, hold on big guy, here are some other numbers to consider.

    Facebook announced revenue in Q1 2016 at $5.2 billion and profit of $1.51 billion tripling its year over year comparison according to a BBC News article that you can read here. Good for them.

    But now consider Twitter, which according to CNN Money has lost a cool $2 billion since 2011. I wonder if this can be construed as an illegal campaign contribution to The Donald. At any rate, Twitter has never turned a profit. Yikes!

    Then there’s LinkedIn. According to a Reuters article from February 4 of this year that you can find here, “LinkedIn Corp forecast first-quarter revenue and profit below Wall Street estimates as growth slows in its ads business and its hiring services face pressure outside North America, dragging its shares down 28 percent after the bell.”

    The article goes on to say that, “Online ad revenue growth slowed to 20 percent in the fourth quarter from 56 percent a year earlier as automated ads offered by Alphabet Inc’s Google make its traditional ad displays less attractive to advertisers.” Finally there was this, “Its revenue forecast of about $820 million also missed analysts’ expectations of $866.9 million by a wide margin.”

    Suddenly it looks like social media has become a winner take all market accentuated by Metcalf’s Law which states that the value of a network is directly proportional to the number of nodes i.e. users in this case. Why use anything but the biggest network unless it’s specialized as LinkedIn is because of its sales and HR focus.

    This is happening despite the high acceptance of social media in everyday life, just ask The Donald. Social has rapidly become the thing everybody loves to use and no one wants to pay for. The advertising business model that most companies rely on doesn’t help.

    Advertising has its limitations. There is a huge pool of money available for online ads but huge is not infinite. Just as there is lots of music available, people only want to pay for hits. If you combine Metcalf’s Law, which tends to limit the number of viable networks in this space and add in the reality of the fickle consumer you have an instant recipe for a declining market, which is what we see.

    Don’t worry, social media is too important to go away. It’s so important that it has commoditized its market into a virtual singularity. That’s the bad news too. The social market looks like it can support 2 styles; say Facebook’s and Twitter’s. There might be additional vendors in the space for a long time especially if larger companies buy them and they function as loss leaders. That’s ultimately the vision I see for any social company not named Twitter or Facebook.

    Published: 8 years ago


    thMicrosoft announced the intent to buy LinkedIn for $196 per share today or more than $26 billion. It’s a huge deal and a great payday for the social networking company specializing in making it easier for business people to connect. But why do this deal and why now? This calls for a lot of speculation but perhaps we can make some sense of it.

    Like other major software companies including Oracle and Salesforce, Microsoft sees itself as an essential platform for enterprises at all levels. The more functionality it can provide to its users, the easier it will be to keep them at home rather than roaming the Internet looking for something new. In addition, the availability of a familiar face such as LinkedIn has great appeal for many customers.

    But also, we may be witnessing the consolidation of the social networking space. Brands like LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook, and others such as Plaxo and MySpace, all got started around the same time—about ten years ago. Since then each has found a niche and many rely on an advertising model for revenue and growth.

    Those models are limited by network constraints, however. Each might be flexible and have great people working there but as Metcalf’s Law stipulates, the value of a network is directly proportional to the number of nodes on it. In our case nodes can be thought of as people and while we might all have Twitter and Facebook accounts, the number that also have a third network is smaller for the simple reason we can only track so much.

    So the advertising potential of networks is similarly limited. There is a large revenue pie for ads on social networks but it isn’t infinite and as is often the case, the early participants like Google continue to capture the lion’s share of revenues. In such a situation, if LinkedIn can be relieved from the need to generate so much ad revenue growth by simply becoming a valuable addition to the overall Microsoft value proposition, so much the better. The situation is similar with other vendors that offer social and collaboration functions as part of their value propositions, like Salesforce and Oracle.

    All this is to say that the age of social media is likely entering a mature phase. We can see which ones will be able to have a stand-alone future and which ones won’t. This doesn’t mean social networks and social media are becoming passé—just the opposite. They’ve become so valuable that they are becoming commodities and it’s hard for commodities to reap soaring profit growth (that’s why they’re commodities).

    So, good for Microsoft and LinkedIn, I think they are better together and their association seems to signal an inflection point in social networking. The strike price of $196 per share is significantly below last year’s peak of nearly $260 but also significantly above Friday’s close of $131.08, just about right in the middle. Is everybody happy?

     

     

    Published: 8 years ago